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Defendants' fraud argument, it did
not need to address whether fraudulent intent of the check writer should
make a difference in the outcome of
this case. Specifically, the court did
not decide whether a fraud exception
existed or whether such an exception
would remove dishonored check
collections from the purview of the
statute. Nevertheless, the court
expressed strong disapproval for a
fraud exception as a violation of the
spirit of the FDCPA. "The Act's
singular focus is on curbing abusive
and deceptive collection practices,
not abusive and deceptive consumer
payment practices." The court noted
that current legal redresses sufficiently remedy debtor fraud, and
spumed the creation of a judicial
exception that "selectively gives a
green light to the very abuses
proscribed by the Act."

Judge Bauer Dissented

Editor's Note

In his dissent, Judge Bauer was
unconvinced that the seller's
acceptance of a check constituted a
creditor-debtor relationship. In the
absence of such a credit relationship,
Plaintiff should not enjoy the
FDCPA's protections. In addition,
Judge Bauer contended that the
majority understated the reasoning
of Zimmerman, stating that a seller
who accepts a check in a "goodsfor-money" transaction consents to
receiving nothing less than money.
Judge Bauer explained that the
debtor who provided a dishonored
check paralleled the thief involved
in shoplifting because the debtor
removed the consent element from
the transaction. Accordingly, a
dishonored check should not be
afforded the protection of the
FDCPA.

Recently, in Charles v. Lundgren
&Assoc., 119 F.3d 739 (9th Cir.
1997), the Ninth Circuit agreed with
the Seventh Circuit that a bad check
constitutes a debt under the FDCPA.
Citing Bass v. Stolper,Koritzinsky,
Brewster & Neider, the court stated
"we agree with its conclusion that,
because 'an offer or extension of
credit is not required for payment
obligation to constitute a 'debt'
under the FDCPA,' the FDCPA
governs the collection of dishonored
checks."

Federal Tobacco Labeling Laws do not Preempt
State Law Requiring Additive and Nicotine
Disclosure
by Irene Kowalczyk
In Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Harshbarger, Nos. 97-8022, 978023, 1997 WL 458881 (1st Cir.
Aug. 18, 1997), the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed the district court's ruling
that neither the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, as
amended (the "FCLAA"), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-41, nor the Comprehensive
Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986 (the "Smokeless

1997

Tobacco Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 440108, preempts the Massachusetts
Disclosure Act (the "Disclosure
Act"), MAss. GEN. LAWS CH. 94, §
307B. The court held that the federal
statutes do not expressly or impliedly preempt the state statute,
which requires cigarette and
smokeless tobacco manufacturers to
make certain disclosures to the
public health department.
Preemption analysis is based on

the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, which invalidates state laws in conflict with
federal laws. Generally, federal law
does not supersede the states' police
powers unless federal preemption is
Congress's intent is "clear and
manifest." Congressional intent
may be either expressed in the
federal statute's language or implied
in its purpose. If there is no explicit
preemption language, the federal act
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may preempt the state law if it
"actually conflicts" with the federal
act. Likewise, "the pervasiveness of
a federal scheme, the dominance of
the federal interest, or the federal
goals and obligations may reasonably permit an inference that
Congress intended a federal law to
'occupy a field' of commerce
exclusively."

Origins of the Dispute
On August 2, 1996, Massachusetts enacted the Disclosure Act, the
first state law of its kind. The statute
requires manufacturers of cigarettes,
snuff, and chewing tobacco sold in
Massachusetts to provide the public
health department with an annual
report, listing all additives and the
nicotine yield rating for each brand
of product sold. The Disclosure Act
classifies as public record the
nicotine yield ratings and any other
information in the manufacturer's
reports that the "department determines that there is a reasonable
scientific basis for concluding that
the availability of such information
could reduce risks to public health."
However, the statute restricts the
state's ability to disclose the
information unless "the attorney
general advises that such disclosure
would not constitute an unconstitutional taking."
On the day of the Massachusetts
Disclosure Act's enactment, the
cigarette manufacturers and smokeless tobacco manufacturers (the
"manufacturers") separately filed
complaints in federal district court
against the Attorney General of
Massachusetts and the Massachusetts Public Health Commissioner
(collectively, the "Commonwealth").
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In addition to alleging several U.S.
Constitutional violations, the
manufacturers contended that the
FCLAA and the Smokeless Tobacco
Act preempted the Disclosure Act
under the Supremacy Clause of the
U.S. Constitution. The parties crossmoved for summary judgment solely
on this issue. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor
of the Commonwealth and certified
the rulings for immediate appeal.
On de novo review, the First
Circuit reviewed the text and
legislative history of the federal
statutes to determine whether the
statutes preempted the state law. The
court first looked to the preemption
language of the 1965 and 1969
versions of the FCLAA and the
Smokeless Tobacco Act, and
concluded that neither federal statute
expressly preempted the Disclosure
Act. Next, the court engaged in an
implied preemption analysis of the
most recent version of the FCLAA,
the 1984 version, and the Smokeless
Tobacco Act. The First Circuit held
that there was no actual conflict
between the federal laws and the
state statute did not tread upon an
exclusive regulatory domain.
Therefore, the federal statutes did
not supersede the Disclosure Act.
The court concluded that neither of
the federal laws prevented the state
from obtaining information about
product additives and nicotine yield
rates.

The FCLAA Does Not
Expressly Preempt the
Massachusetts Disclosure
Act
In analyzing whether the FCLAA
preempts the Disclosure Act, the

court heavily relied upon the
Supreme Court's decision in
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505
U.S. 504 (1992). In Cipollone,
Plaintiff sued cigarette manufacturers for injuries stemming from the
lung cancer death of Rose
Cipollone. The Supreme Court
interpreted the language of the
preemption clauses of the 1965 and
1969 versions of the FCLAA and
specifically addressed whether state
common law damages were expressly preempted by the FCLAA.
Congress passed the first version
of the FCLAA in 1965 and
amended the statute in 1969 and
1984. The Cipollone Court, however, only addressed the first two
versions of the FCLAA. The Court
found that the purposes of the 1965
Act were: "(1) adequately informing
the public that cigarette smoking
may be hazardous to health, and (2)
protecting the national economy
from the burden imposed by the
diverse, nonuniform, and confusing
cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations." Id. at 514. To implement the first purpose, the statute
required manufacturers to include
health warning labels on all cigarette
packages. To further the second
purpose, the statute included an
express preemption provision which
prohibited states from requiring
health warning labels on cigarette
packages or in their advertising. The
statute included the provision: "No
statement relating to smoking and
health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of
this Act." 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)
(1966).
The 1969 Act strengthened the

Volume 9, number 4

Recent Cases

language of the health warning label
and prohibited cigarette advertising
on television, radio, and other
electronic media. The amended
statute also replaced the preemption
subsection with the current version,
which states: "No requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State
law with respect to the advertising
or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of
this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)
(1969).
The Cipollone Court held that the
1965 Act did not preempt state
common law damages actions.
However, a plurality found that the
preemption language of the 1969
Act was broader and therefore
precluded some common law
claims. The plurality formulated a
test to determine whether a particular common law claim was preempted: "we ask whether the legal
duty that is the predicate of the
common-law damages action
constitutes a 'requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and
health.., imposed under State law
with respect to... advertising and
promotion,' giving that clause a fair
but narrow reading."
The court of appeals in the
instant case modified the Cipollone
test and asked, "whether or not the
'predicate legal duty' created by the
Disclosure Act constituted (1) a
'requirement or prohibition...
imposed under State law,' (2) 'based
on smoking and health,' (3) 'with
respect to the advertising or promotion of any [properly labeled]
cigarettes."' If the three prongs are
satisfied, the state statute is preempted by the federal legislation.
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The First Circuit found that the
Disclosure Act satisfied the first
prong of the modified test based
upon the unanimous agreement of
the Cipollone Court that "positive
enactments" by the state legislature
are state-imposed "requirements or
prohibitions" within the scope of the
1969 FCLAA. The court in the
instant case found that the Disclosure Act also satisfied the second
prong of the modified test because
the Act's stated purpose is "protecting the public health." The court
found that the text of the Disclosure
Act implied that its goal was to
increase public awareness of the
additives and nicotine in tobacco
products and their potential health
effects.
The main dispute in the instant
case centered on the third prong of
the preemption analysis. The
manufacturers argued that the
Disclosure Act's obligations were
"with respect to" advertising and
promotion under the 1969 FCLAA
preemption clause and therefore, the
federal statute prohibited states from
imposing any additional disclosure
requirements. The Disclosure Act
compelled the manufacturers to
communicate information to the
public health department, eventually
making the information publicly
available. The cigarette manufacturers argued that if the Commonwealth could not directly compel
public disclosure, it could not
indirectly accomplish disclosure
through a "public service advertising
campaign."
The court looked to the Cipollone
decision, in which the plurality
opinion and a concurring opinion
separately defined the phrase "with
respect to... advertising and

promotion." The plurality found that
the FCLAA did not preempt claims
that rested solely on actions unrelated to advertising and promotion,
including testing and research. For
example, fraudulent misrepresentation claims are not preempted by
federal law if they rely upon a stateimposed obligation "to disclose such
facts through channels of communication other than advertising or
promotion." Cipollone, at 528. The
plurality hypothesized that the
FCLAA would not preempt a state
law that required manufacturers to
disclose facts about smoking and
health to an administrative agency.
Accordingly, the First Circuit in the
instant case found that under the
Cipollone plurality's definition, the
Disclosure Act's requirements are
not "with respect to" advertising or
promotion because the annual
reports and potential public disclosure were not "through" an advertising or promotion channel.
In Cipollone, Justice Scalia's
concurrence, which Justice Thomas
joined, disagreed with the plurality's
narrow interpretation of the phrase
"with respect to ...advertising and
promotion." Justice Scalia reasoned
that the 1969 FCLAA preempted
"claims based on duties that can be
complied with by taking action
either within the advertising and
promotional realm or elsewhere." Id.
at 554. However, Justice Scalia
speculated that a hypothetical law
mandating disclosure of producthealth hazards to a state public
health agency would not fall under
the scope of the preemption clause.
His inquiry focused upon whether
the state law "practically compels"
the manufacturers to engage in
behavior prohibited by the FCLAA.
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Justice Scalia reasoned that the
FCLAA would not preempt the
hypothetical agency-reporting law
since its obligations could not
possibly be satisfied through
advertising and promotion efforts.
The Disclosure Act differs from
Justice Scalia's hypothetical law in
that the manufacturers' reports could
potentially be publicized under the
Act. However, the court of appeals
in the instant case found that, under
Justice Scalia's interpretation, the
Disclosure Act would not be
preempted by the FCLAA. The
Disclosure Act does not "practically
compel" the manufacturers to
communicate health warnings to the
public because the statute's obligations cannot be satisfied by advertising or promotional efforts. Direct
communication of the additives and
nicotine yield ratings through
advertisement could not satisfy the
state-imposed requirements, and the
Disclosure Act does not suggest
alternative methods of compliance.
Under both the plurality's and
Justice Scalia's interpretations of the
FCLAA, the court of appeals in the
instant case found that the Disclosure Act does not impose obligations
"with respect to... advertising and
promotion" that are preempted by
the federal statute.

The Smokeless Tobacco Act
Does Not Expressly Preempt
the Massachusetts
Disclosure Act.
The First Circuit found that the
Smokeless Tobacco Act's preemption clause does not invalidate the
Massachusetts Disclosure Act. The
federal statute provides that "No
statement relating to the use of
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smokeless tobacco products and
health, other than the statements
required by [this act], shall be
required by any State or local statute
or regulation to be included on any
package or in any advertisement
(unless the advertisement is an
outdoor billboard advertisement of a
smokeless tobacco product)." 15
U.S.C. § 4406(b). Unlike the
broader FCLAA preemption
provision, the Smokeless Tobacco
Act narrowly tailors its prohibition
to statements "on any package" and
"inany advertisements." In comparison, the Disclosure Act only
requires the manufacturers to submit
reports to the public health department and does not require any
statements on tobacco packages or
advertisements. Therefore, the court
held that the express language of the
Smokeless Tobacco Act does not
supersede the Disclosure Act's
reporting obligations to the public
health department.

Neither the FCLAA Nor the
Smokeless Tobacco Act
Impliedly Preempt the
Massachusetts Disclosure
Act.
After the First Circuit found that
the 1965 and 1969 versions of the
FCLAA and the Smokeless Tobacco
Act do not expressly preempt the
Massachusetts Disclosure Act, the
court addressed the manufacturers'
implied preemption arguments.
Because the Cipollone Court held
that the preemptive scope of the
1965 and 1969 Acts is governed
entirely by the express language of
their preemption clauses, the First
Circuit engaged in an implied
preemption analysis solely on the

1984 amendments of the FCLAA
and the Smokeless Tobacco Act.
Both the 1984 FCLAA amendments and the Smokeless Tobacco
Act require manufacturers to submit
an annual report to the Secretary of
Health and Human Services ("Secretary"), listing all ingredients added
to tobacco products. However,
neither the company nor the brand
of tobacco-product must be identified in the listing, and the information may be submitted aggregately
by more than one manufacturer. The
statutes provide that the information
is treated as a trade secret or
confidential information, and that
the Secretary must ensure the
confidentiality of the information
through enumerated procedures and
safety measures. At certain times,
the Secretary provides reports to
Congress on research activities
regarding the health effects or risks
of tobacco additives. Congressional
committees and subcommittees may
request the ingredient information
despite its confidential classification. Based upon the anonymous and
aggregate ingredient reporting, the
manufacturers made two arguments
that the federal statutes impliedly
preempt the Disclosure Act: (1) the
Disclosure Act conflicts with the
preemptive intent of Congress; and
(2) Congress intended exclusive
federal regulation in the area of
tobacco-product sales.

The Disclosure Act Does Not
"Actually Conflict" With the
1984 Version of the FCLAA.
The manufacturers contended
that Congress intended to strike a
balance of national interests by
passing the federal statutes: educat-
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ing the public about the health
effects of using tobacco products,
and limiting commercial burdens on
the tobacco industry. The manufacturers based this argument on a case
decided before the Supreme Court's
review of Cipollone, Palmerv.
Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620
(lst Cir. 1987). In Palmer,the court
broadly interpreted Congress'
purposes underlying the FCLAA as
"health protection... and trade
protection," and applied a "balance
of national interests theory" to
weigh the state law's effect on the
national economy.
The court of appeals in the
instant case, however, found that the
Cipollone Court rejected the Palmer
theory and narrowly interpreted
Congress's intent behind the
FCLAA. The Cipollone majority
expressed the purposes of the
FCLAA as: "(1) adequately informing the public [of any adverse health
effects of smoking], and (2) protecting the national economy from the
burden imposed by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette
labeling and advertising regulations." Cipollone, at 514. The First
Circuit concluded that, under
Cipollone's narrower interpretation
of Congressional purpose, the
Disclosure Act does not actually
conflict with the federal statutes.
The Court reasoned that the state
law does not obstruct the federallyrequired warning labels and does not
impose "diverse, nonuniform, and
confusing labeling and advertising
regulations."
The First Circuit rejected the
manufacturers' second argument that
the anonymity and confidentiality
protections of the federal statutes
demonstrate legislative intent to
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preempt state laws without similar
protections. The court found that the
potential public disclosure of the
reported information is not dependent upon enforcement of the
Disclosure Act, and does not directly
or indirectly conflict with the federal
confidentiality provisions. The court
looked to the text and legislative
history of the federal statutes in
determining that Congress primarily
intended the reporting provisions to
further toxicological research.
Without a specific suggestion that
Congress intended to preempt
additional state obligations or assure
uniformity in regulations, the
manufacturers' arguments failed to
overcome the strong presumption
against preemption.

Congress Did Not Intend to
Exclusively Regulate All
Aspects of the TobaccoProduct Field.
The court also dismissed the
manufacturers' second implied
preemption argument, that the
Disclosure Act impermissibly
encroaches upon an exclusive
federal realm. While the court
acknowledged that the FCLAA and
Smokeless Tobacco Act preempt
regulation in the area of tobaccoproduct labeling and warnings, the
statutes do not imply an exclusive
regulation of the entire tobaccoproduct field. The main purpose of
the federal reporting provisions is to
promote toxicological research on
the health hazards of tobacco
additives. While the federal statutes
bear some relation to labeling and
advertising, the Disclosure Act
would not directly nor substantially
affect federal efforts in this area.

Because Congress's intent to
supersede state regulation in the area
of product ingredient collecting was
not "clear and manifest," the court
held that neither of the federal
statutes preempt the Massachusetts
Disclosure Act.
In sum, the FCLAA and the
Smokeless Tobacco Act do not
preempt the Massachusetts Disclosure Act. The preemption clauses of
the 1965 FCLAA, the 1969 FCLAA,
and the Smokeless Tobacco Act do
not expressly supersede state efforts
in the tobacco-product field.
Furthermore, the purpose and
structure of the 1984 FCLAA and
the Smokeless Tobacco Act do not
impliedly preempt the Disclosure
Act. The state act does not "actually
conflict" with federal efforts nor
does it impermissibly intrude on a
field for which Congress intended
exclusive federal regulation.
Therefore, the court held that the
Disclosure Act, the first state law of
its kind, is not superseded by federal
law and may properly impose
reporting obligations upon cigarette
manufacturers.
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